TASK (91004)
CIA-STARGATE
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The document is a summary report from the CIA's Stargate program, specifically project 91004. The report focuses on the political/military indicators and possible location of indicators that could precede an imminent Iraqi attack. The report includes the responses from different sources, identified as Sources 018, 025, 049, 052, and 079.
Source 018 suggests that preemptive Iraqi strikes are not anticipated in the near future. Heavy equipment movement and missile launches are expected in specific areas, but front line troops will not advance. There may be indications of special weapons, such as an interference device and an energetic/beam-type device.
Source 025 mentions that Iraqi preemptive action is not anticipated until after February 1991, and that a surprise attack may occur from the Kuwait side in early February. The conflict is expected to result in a new leader for Iraq by April.
Source 049 discusses considerable aircraft activity, objects buried in the sand, shutdown of communications or command and control systems, and SCUD missile launches, among other indicators. They also mention planned activity in the vicinity of Mecca and that Hussein is ruthless and unconcerned about world opinion.
Source 052 suggests that Iraq may initiate a preemptive attack into Saudi Arabia, with considerable aircraft activity preceding it. They mention the possible use of a "light beam/heat" associated with the assault.
Source 079 indicates that Hussein will not back out of Kuwait and that there will be no political or military movement in the near future. Saudi Arabian oil wells are targeted, and there may be terrorist activity anticipated against Shell Oil Co.
Overall, the report suggests that near term preemptive strikes are not expected, but there are mixed opinions on possible long term preemptive strike areas. Some sources anticipate special weapons and SCUD strikes, while others do not anticipate Iraqi withdrawal from Kuwait.
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(S/NF/LIMDIS) TASK 91004 What are the political/military
indicators, and possible location of indicators, that would precede
an imminent Iraqi attack, if any?
(S/NF/LIMDIS BACKGROUND): This tasking was responded to by
Sources 018 (A), 025 (B), 049 (C), 052 (D),.and 079 (E).
S/NF/LIMDIS) DT-S RESPONSE: Appendix A provides the DT-S
response.
(S/NF/LIMDIS) DB ASSESSMENT OF THE DT-S RESPONSE: Appendix B
provides this assessment.
SG1H
In sum, the DB (OICC) assessment was marginal at best, and the
feedback provided as to the rationale for the assessment was less
than satisfactory. On the other hand, it is difficult to evaluate
predictive responses with time frames. In some cases the
predictive response may have been reality at the time it was made;
however, there may have been mitigating circumstances as to why an
event did or did not occur. The value of the DT-S response is that
of a tip-off for collectors, somewhat akin to indications and
warning. In other words, because a predictive event did not occur
does not make the response invalid.
Referral Review by NIMA/DoD
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SECRET
DEFENSE
INTELLIGENCE
AGENCY
DT-9-1025-SL
SUMMARY REPORT (U)
PROJECT 91004
24 Januarg 1991
NOFORN
SECRET
LIWDIS
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UNLI
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PROJECT 91004
REPRODUCTION REQUIRES APPROVAL OF
ORIGINATOR OR HIGHER DOD AUTHORITY.
FURTHER DISSEMINATION ONLY AS DIRECTED
BY DT OR HIGHER DOD AUTHORITY.
24 JANUARY 1991
NOT RELEASABLE TO FOREIGN NATIONALS
CLASSIFIED BY: DIA/DT
DECLASSIFY ON: OADR
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TABLE OF CONTENTS
I PURPOSE
II BACKGROUND
III TASK
IV CAVEATS
V RESPONSES
VI REMARKS
PAGE
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PROJECT 91004
I. (U) PURPOSE:
(U) This report documents follow on to project 90104,
task A.
II. (U) BACKGROUND:
(S/NF/LIMDIS) Project 90104 initiated a series of tasks
concerning the Iraqi situation. One of these, task A, requested
political/military indicators, and possible location of
indicators, that would precede an imminent Iraqi attack, if any.
Previous reporting on task A occurred on 30 October 1990.
(U) Preliminary data from this task for some of the sources
was presented in an MFR on 15 Jan 91.
(U) Task completion was delayed due to higher priority
tasking received on 15 Jan 91.
III. (U) TASK:
(U) Tasking was. presented as a direct question as
identified in the above request.
(U) This task will be updated frequently.
IV. (U) CAVEATS:
(S) Predictive aspects of this task should be updated
frequently (i.e., in 1-2 week periods).
V. (U) RESPONSES:
a. (U) SOURCE 018:
(1) (U) DATE OF INFORMATION (DOI): 16 Jan 91.
(2) (S/NF/LIMDIS) DATA SUMMARY:
Preemptive Iraqi strikes are not anticipated in
the near future (1-2 weeks).
- Weather (rainstorms) will be a problem, in the
southern area in 3-5 days (19-21 Jan).
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- Some heavy equipment movement (east to west) is
anticipated in near term in Kuwait (area A
on FIG 1).
- Within 1-3 days (i.e., 17-19 Jan 91), Iraq will
launch missiles (into S Arabia areas):
o Front line troops will not advance.
- Future potential strikes may occur in area B,
FIG 1.
- Iraq may have two "special" weapons:
o Some type of "interference" device that
causes electronic/mechanical equipment to
"freeze up" or (lose effectiveness).
o Some type of energetic/beam-type device
may be located in the sand. in area C, FIG 1.
b. (U) SOURCE 025:
(1) (U) DOI: 16 Jan 91.
(2) (U) DATA SUMMARY:
- Iraqi preemptive action is not anticipated
until after February 1991:
o A surprise attack may occur from the
Kuwait side in early February.
- This conflict will result in a new Iraq leader
by the April time frame.
c. (U) SOURCE 049:
(1) (U) DOI: 15 Jan 91.
(2) (S/NF/LIMDIS) DATA SUMMARY:
- There will be considerable aircraft activity
(North, toward Turkey border):
o Some old, slow (transport-like) aircraft
are involved.
- Large groups of objects, now buried in the
sand, will be uncovered.
- Something like communications, or command and
control, with lower ranking individuals will be
shutdown (or turned off):
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o Sense of disbelief (by high level people).
o Some sort of abandonment occurs (in many
areas).
- SCUD missile launches will be used as a
distractor:
o Outskirts of RIYADA is one target area.
- Aircraft carriers and hospital ships are
targets (via aircraft suicide runs, missiles).
- Some type of "activity" is planned in vicinity
of MECCA.
- Hussein's attitude is ruthless; not concerned
about world opinion.
d. (U) SOURCE 052:
(1) (U) DOI: 15 Jan 91.
(2) (S/NF/LIMDIS) DATA SUMMARY:
- Iraq may initiate preemptive attack into Saudi
Arabia, (vicinity of 30-20'N/43-151'.9,)..-, _ Time frame
unclear, though some type of activity (indicator)
may occur night of 14 Jan 91:
o Considerable aircraft activity will
precede.
o Some type of "light beam/heat" may be
associated with the possible assault.
e. (U) SOURCE 079:
(1) (U) DOI: 16 Jan 91.
(2) (S/NF/LIMDIS) DATA SUMMARY:
- Hussein will not'back out of Kuwait.
- Hussein will not move politically or militarily
in near future.
- Saudi Arabia oil wells are targeted:
o Terrorist activity anticipated against
Shell Oil Co.
- Attacks (Iraq or US) not anticipated (in near
future).
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VI. (U) REMARKS:
a. (S/NF) Sources generally indicate that near term (1-2
weeks) preemptive strikes will not occur.
b. (S/NF) Sources are mixed as to possible long term
preemptive strike areas; candidate areas include central south
Kuwait border, or a central area along the Iraq/Saudi Arabia
border.
c. (S/NF) Two sources anticipates special (surprise)
weapons; another anticipates near term SCUD strikes into Saudi
Arabia as well as suicide strikes against allied ships.
d. (S/NF) The most experience source does not a anticipate
Iraqi backing out of Kuwait.
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