ANOMALOUS HUMAN-COMPUTER INTERACTION (AHCI): TOWARDS AN UNDERSTANDING OF WHAT CONSTITUTES AN ANOMALY (OR, HOW TO MAKE FRIENDS AND

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 ANOMALOUS HUMAN-COMPUTER INTERACTION (AHCI):
 TOWARS
 (OR,                                                  AN
 HOW TO MAKE FRIENDS AND INFLUENCE
 COMPUTERS)
 K. Morgan (Dept. of Psychology, Univ9Jty of Edinburgh,
 7 George Square, Edinburgh EH8
 This paper is an attempt to clarify in what manner a genuine
 anomaly can be distinguished from an incident explicable by
 physical means.  It also tries to exemplify the various methods that
 could be used to simulate an anomalous human-computer interaction
 (AHCI).  This paper does not dwell in any more than a superficial obs manner upon the psychology involvedi in manipulati go bservrrs
 which would allow the described phy
 out.  That would demand a paper in its own right.
 Part of the research being carried out at the Koestler Chair
 and other institutions is the investigation of anomalous human-
 computer interaction.  As with any area of parapsychological re-
 search there always exists the danger of the researcher mistaking
 a normally explicable phenomenon as an anomaly.        paper   s
 written to help people who are confronted by an unusual happening
 to evaluate the situation
 on a computer sibility of there beng normal methods offsimulating almost any pos
 anom aly .
 The various categories into which both simulated and genuine
 anomalies could fall can be separated into the following:
 (1)  Human.  The majority of so-called anomalies might be
 found to be caused by the users' ignorance of their own computer
 system or aspects of it.  This, coupled with the human trait of
 forcing unconnected events into meaningful patterns, might explain
 many anomalies.
 (2)  Software Anomaly.  The methods of achieving the simula-
 tion of a softwar                                                                                                                                          dware-based) anomaly can be broken down
 into the following categories:
 (a)  Replacement of the target program.  The target program
 or process is exchanged for an amended version that contains the
 extra "feature" that will become the "anomaly."
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 (b)  Adjusting or amending the target program or process.
 In this scenario the target process is amended at the same time or
 very shortly before the "anomaly."  This would of course demand
 the knowledge of the specification of the software being used at the
 target site.
 (c)  Breaches in computer /organizational security both prior
 to and simultaneously with anomaly. These are often a necessary
 prerequisite of any of the above software anomalies.  The breach in
 security could even be from a remote site, via a computer communica-
 tion link that has access to the target system.  The use of inter-
 preted languages or online debugging (disassembling) tools makes
 this reasonably easy.
 (3)  Hardware Anomaly.  This section covers any physical ef-
 fect that occurs to an item of computer machinery (but not to the
 logic controlling it).  These "effects" could often take the form
 of either repairing or destroying an item of equipment.  These items
 could be anything from a personal electronic belonging (e.g., an
 electronic watch) to a computer's storage device.
 (a)  Replacement.  In this scenario an exact duplicate of the
 target is prepared and exchanged for the target item when the op-
 portunity arises.  The duplicate has some extra "feature" which will
 be used by the false anomalist to simulate the required anomaly.
 (b)  Adjustment/destruction--"live."  To adjust or amend an
 item of equipment is not as difficult as it might appear.  Much com-
 puting equipment is sensitive to one or many of the following en-
 vironmental influences :  weak magnetic fields, physical force (e.g.,
 bending), exposure for long periods to strong sunlight, contact
 with sharp objects, extreme humidity, temperatures outside the
 tolerated range, contact with static electricity, and any substances
 or object making contact with a recording or electrically conductive
 surface.
 (c)  Breaches in computer /organizational security before or
 simultaneously with anomaly.  In contrast to the previous scenarios,
 simulating hardware anomalies requires the physical presence of the
 false anomalist or environmental influence in order to achieve the
 anomaly.
 (4)  External to Computer System.  Such things as electrical
 mains fluctuations are a possible example of natural "disasters,"
 and if the fluctuation coincided with some other meaningful event
 the users might decide that an anomaly had occurred which had a
 correlation with that meaningful event, thus starting local lore
 about this false correlation.
 Methods of Avoiding Computer-Based Fraudulent Anomalies
 Examples of new technology that might help alleviate the above-
 mentioned problems are
 (1)  WORMS (write once read many times) optical disks.
 These (at present) are noneditable and are immune to "grubby
 thumbs," magnetic fields, and static.  They are therefore much
 better potential psi-corruption targets than the currently favorite
 floppy disk, especially if the target data on the disk are well en-
 crypted and the disk uniquely identified.
 (2)  Optical fiber cables.  This makes data transmission line
 monitoring or adjustment much more complex.
 (3)  Automated technical advisers for computer-based security.
 These can rapidly and thoroughly analyze a large and highly com-
 plex system specification for security weaknesses.  They are only
 as good as the level of detail or accuracy in the specification and
 the expertise of their user.
 (4)  Gypsy verification environments & (5) Program analysis
 tools.  Both of these methods could be useful in the analysis of a
 piece of code that has been in an "anomaly."  Again, they are sub-
 ject to the same weaknesses discussed under the previous heading.
 (6)  Cryptographic methods.  These can be highly effective
 in preventing access to information, provided a sufficiently good
 encryption method is selected.
 (7)  Shielding.  Simple shielding of vdu screen emission can
 eliminate the chance of a computer screen being reconstituted out-
 side the system confines.
 This paper has tried to portray the various scenarios that
 could be misinterpreted as an "anomalous" human-computer inter-
 action (AHCI).  It also tried to show that there are conceptual pat-
 terns that allow AHCI anomalies to be categorized, along with their
 possible fraudulent explanations.  It is hoped that armed with such
 a method of categorization experimenters may be able better to re-
 cord and evaluate the intriguing field of AHCI.  In such evaluations
 it may be more cost effective to create a means of detecting a fraud-
 ulent anomaly rather than to proof a system against every possible
 threat.  A highly motivated false anomalist with large financial and
 time resources might be able to create fraudulent anomalies, regard-
 less of the tightest precautions.  Experimenters might therefore
 find it helpful to adopt an experimental condition where no one
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 Papers
 star "makes or breaks" the results.  By using large "anonymous"
 source groups the incentive for any one individual to create false
 anomalies might be greatly reduced.
 WHEN WILL WE BEGIN TO REDUCE ALPHA AND BETA ERRORS
 IN STATISTICAL PSI EXPERIMENTS?
 Ulrich Timm (Institut fur Grenzgebiete der Psychologie and
 Psychohygiene, Eichhalde 12, 7800 Freiburg i.Br., West
 Germany)
 In many psi experi
 made, after whose correct
 appears.  These are Type
 That does not necessarily
 real psi effects do not exis
 correctly, are often so inef
 instability, and inconsistenc
 seldom lead to statistical sign
 cal methods creates Type II er
 tical selection errors are
 'statistical significance dis-
 er, that in these experiments
 e usual methods, if utilized
 ith regard to the rareness,
 e.  This inefficiency of statisti-
 or beta errors.  Therefore,
 gnificances but also the reduction
 ase of real significance.
 First I give an overview of tho e alpha errors that I call
 statistical selection errors.  T ese sho , simply stated, the follow-
 ing three qualities (Timm, 4, 1983, 19k-229):
 (1)   From a set of st  istical result a single result is se-
 lected and eval  ted by some si   ficance test.
 (2)   The selection not performed radomly but according
 to a criterion hat is related to th level of the single
 result in that it directly or indirectly favors positive
 (3)   Despite this success-dependent selection, the significance
 test is carri~d out and interpreted in the usual manner
 without any correction.
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